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A Comment on Erin McCampbell's Tipping
the Scales: Seeking Death Through
Comparative Value Arguments
Timothy J. Heaphy*
Erin McCampbell's Note, Tipping the Scales: Seeking Death Through
Comparative Value Arguments,' brings insightful and important attention to a
highly controversial subject in capital sentencing litigation. McCampbell
asserts that such arguments persuade jurors but offend the Constitution. I
disagree with both her assumption of the effectiveness of these arguments and
her view of their constitutionality. "Comparative value" arguments do not
violate a capital defendant's Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, as they
do not misstate the framework which the jury must apply to its ultimate
sentencing determination. Moreover, a prosecutor's argument that a murder
victim's life was somehow more valuable than the life of the man or woman
responsible for his death runs the risk of offending individual jurors and flies in
the face of both the adversarial process and the gatekeeping role of the court in
guiding juror discretion.
L What Is a Comparative Value Argument?
It is important to begin a discussion of this topic with some definition of
what constitutes a comparative value argument. There are three distinct
categories of arguments which fall within McCampbell's broad definition of
comparative value. I believe each of these categories must be considered
separately, as each category prompts a different result when held to
Constitutional scrutiny.
The first category of comparative value argument is the type in which a
prosecutor explicitly suggests to the jury that its sentencing discretion can and
should be reduced to a simple mathematical formula. For instance, a
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prosecutor might argue that because a victim's virtuous life was more valuable
than a capital defendant's despicable life, the jury must impose the death
penalty. An example of this kind of argument is found in Hall v. Catoe.2 In
that case, the prosecutor argued:
I am talking about values, because a jury verdict is a statement of values.
And I am not talking about dollars and cents as far as what the [lives of the
two girls were] worth, but nevertheless it is a question of values. What are
the lives of these two girls worth? Are they worth the life of this man, the
psychopath, this killer who stabs and stabs and kills, and rapes and
kidnaps?
3
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found that argument unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment.4  The court specifically held that the
prosecutor's argument "unquestionably directed the jurors to conduct an
arbitrary balancing of worth, which required that Hall be sentenced to death if
the jury found Hall's life was worth less than the lives of his victims."5 Hall
demonstrates that a comparative value argument that misdirects jurors as to the
legal standards that the law requires them to apply in arriving at their
sentencing verdict is clearly unconstitutional. Any argument which suggests
that capital sentencing is a contest of "comparative worth" rather than a
reasoned balancing of specific, articulated factors will offend due process.
A second category of comparative value argument falls on the other, less
objectionable end of the spectrum. A prosecutor might recite the virtues of the
victim and the immoral character of the defendant without explicitly
juxtaposing or linking the two. As the Supreme Court held in Payne v.
Tennessee,6 victim impact evidence is admissible "to show.., each victim's
'uniqueness as an individual human being.' 7 Similarly, the government may
introduce evidence that bears upon a portrait of the defendant as a "uniquely
individual human being[]. '8  This authority makes clear that in a capital
sentencing hearing, the government may properly introduce evidence regarding
the life, conduct, and character of both the victim and the defendant. A
2. Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335 (S.C. 2004).
3. Id. at 339.
4. Id. at 339-40.
5. Id. at 341.
6. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
7. Id. at 823 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987)).
8. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,304 (1976) (finding unconstitutional a
statute that failed "to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character
and record of each convicted defendant").
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summation in which the prosecutor restates established facts without comparing
them is consequently proper.
The final category of comparative value argument falls somewhere
between the above two categories. A prosecutor might explicitly juxtapose the
life events, choices, or character of a murder victim with significant events,
decisions, and qualities of the defendant, without asking the jury to compare
them or arguing that the comparison between those individuals is the basis on
which the jury should make its ultimate determination of sentence. A good
example of this middle ground comparative value argument was at issue in
Humphries v. Ozmint.9 The prosecutor in that case juxtaposed certain events in
the life of the victim with specific bad acts of the defendant as follows:
[I]n 1984 [Dickie Smith] met Pat, and they fell in love, and they got
married. That's the same year Shawn Paul Humphries committed two
house break-ins at age 13. 1986-Dickie makes a pretty drastic move. He
decides he's going to quit Kemet and go build homes full-time, and he goes
out, and he starts building homes in the community he had grown up in.
That's the same year Shawn Paul Humphries is up for his second probation
violation and sent down to Columbia. Then in 1988, July the 4th, they have
a little baby girl named Ashley.... That's the same year Shawn Paul
Humphries went to jail for two years. 1
Comparative value arguments such as the one at issue in Humphries invite
a jury to compare the relative "worth" of the victim and the defendant. They
stop short, however, of misstating the legal standard that jurors must apply to
their sentencing determination. This "middle ground" third category of
comparative value argument is perhaps more accurately called "comparative
worth" argument. These worth juxtapositions are susceptible to different
conclusions when held to constitutional scrutiny. Accordingly, I will focus my
observations on this final category of comparative value arguments.
II. Comparative Worth Arguments Do Not Violate the Eighth Amendment
McCampbell argues that the prosecutor's juxtaposition of the life of the
murder victim and that of the defendant in Humphries violated the Eighth
Amendment, as it misdirected the jurors as to their role in capital sentencing
and the proper uses of victim impact and mitigation evidence." Her argument
9. Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 128
(2005).
10. Id. at 237.
11. McCampbell, supra note 1, at 408-16.
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must fail, as the prosecutor neither directly nor implicitly misstated the
standards by which jurors must approach their sentencing determination.1 2 The
Humphries comparative worth argument relies strictly upon evidence properly
admitted. 13 It in no way suggests that jurors should evaluate victim impact or
mitigation evidence for any improper purpose.' 4 Accordingly, this type of
argument does not offend the Eighth Amendment.'
5
As McCampbell correctly points out, prosecutorial argument may violate
the Eighth Amendment if it misdirects jurors as to their role.' 6 Interpreting
Caldwell v. Mississippi,17 McCampbell correctly articulates the standard by
which a comparative value argument would be evaluated under the Eighth
Amendment:
To successfully challenge comparative value arguments under Caldwell,
defendants must establish that (1) the law requires jurors to use a certain
type of analysis in making their sentencing decision, and (2) that by making
a comparative value argument, the prosecutor directed jurors to use a
different analysis, and (3) that this misdirection on the law infected the trial
with arbitrariness in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
18
The prosecutor's argument in Humphries did not violate the Caldwell
standard. By juxtaposing significant achievements in the life of the victim with
mistakes, periods of incarceration, or other bad acts of the defendant, the
prosecutor artfully summarized evidence properly before the jury.19 He did not
take the forbidden step taken by the prosecutor in Hall, telling them that the
jury's weighing of the relative worth of the victim and the defendant should be
dispositive in their ultimate determination of punishment.20 The comparative
worth argument made in Humphries did not encourage the jury to ignore the
requirement of finding the existence of a statutory aggravating factor beyond a
reasonable doubt. Nor did this argument suggest to the jury that it should
ignore validly introduced mitigation evidence. As it stayed faithful to the legal
standard articulated by the judge's instructions to the jury for evaluation of the
death penalty, the argument was proper.
12. Humphries, 397 F.3d at 223.
13. Id. at 219.
14. Id. at 223-24.
15. Id. at 225.
16. McCampbell, supra note 1, at 393-400.
17. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
18. McCampbell, supra note 1, at 404.
19. Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 211-15 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
128 (2005).
20. Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 339-40 (S.C. 2004).
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McCampbell suggests that comparative worth arguments encourage jurors
to unduly credit victim impact evidence. 2' That assertion has no merit. The
prosecutor's argument in Humphries relied upon facts that establish the
uniqueness of the victim, 22 a category of evidence clearly recognized as relevant
by the Supreme Court in Payne.23 The prosecutor simply restated facts
properly admitted in the sentencing hearing. 24 He did not misinform the jurors
as to how they should consider that properly admitted victim impact evidence.
His juxtaposition of properly admitted facts neither directly nor indirectly
misdirected the jurors as to the standards they were required to apply to their
sentencing decision. Accordingly, his argument did not run afoul of the Eighth
Amendment.
McCampbell also suggests that the juxtaposition of the victim and the
defendant misdirects jurors as to the appropriate uses of mitigation evidence by
encouraging jurors to ignore evidence that does not increase a defendant's
"score" on the scale of moral value.25 That assertion fails to recognize the
persuasive force of evidence on the impact of mental deficiency, abuse and
neglect, substance abuse, or other misfortune on a capital defendant. These
facts do not make a defendant more "valuable." By contrast, they make the
defendant less "valuable" on an objective scale of comparative worth. Such
evidence nonetheless has a significant impact on a jury's consideration of that
defendant's culpability and the propriety of the death penalty. Comparative
worth arguments do not suggest to jurors that important aspects of mitigation
are irrelevant. Indeed, they may even incorporate the details of a defendant's
misfortune and acknowledge the mitigating impact of those facts.
Far from violating the Eighth Amendment, comparative worth arguments
like those at issue in Humphries are consistent with the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment analysis in Payne. One of the bases for the Court's explicit
recognition of the relevance of victim impact evidence in Payne was the need
to "balance" the broad category of mitigating information presented by a capital
defendant. The Court specifically held:
The State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence
which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that
just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim
21. McCampbell, supra note 1, at 408-11.
22. Humphries, 397 F.3d at 212-14.
23. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
24. Humphries, 397 F.3d at 220-21.
25. McCampbell, supra note 1, at 411-14.
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is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in
particular to his family.
26
The Court's use of the term "counteracting" explicitly invites comparison
between two categories of evidence-information about the defendant's
character and background brought forth by the defense, and information about
the uniqueness of the victim, offered by the government. The first category is
broad, as capital defendants are entitled to present almost anything that may
bear upon mitigation. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment
prevents states from "limit[ing] the sentencer's consideration of any relevant
circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the [death] penalty.
27
Applying this broad standard of admissibility, courts have imposed very little
restriction on a defendant's ability to present mitigation evidence. In Payne,
the Supreme Court recognized that the government has a legitimate interest in
counteracting such mitigation with information about the victim. The Court's
explicit recognition of that interest undercuts McCampbell's objection to
comparative value arguments. The Court actually invites such argument, so
long as it does not misstate the legal standards that govern the jury's ultimate
sentencing decision.
The Supreme Court, in Payne, also recognized that a jury's consideration
of victim impact evidence is consistent with community consensus as to the
relevance of this information. Justice O'Connor framed the issue as follows:
"The Eighth Amendment stands as a shield against those practices and
punishments which are either inherently cruel or which so offend the moral
consensus of this society as to be deemed cruel and unusual" ... Certainly
there is no strong societal consensus that a jury may not take into account
the loss suffered by a victim's family or that a murder victim must remain a
faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Just the opposite is
true. Most states have enacted legislation enabling judges and juries to
consider victim impact evidence.28
Comparative value arguments are thus potentially violative of the Eighth
Amendment if they are either "inherently cruel" or offensive to the "moral
consensus of this society." The difference of opinion as to the propriety of
these arguments reflected in the caselaw cited by McCampbell in this area
demonstrates that they are not "cruel" per se. Consequently, they must be
measured against community standards.
26. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (emphasis added).
27. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987).
28. Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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The "moral consensus of this society" standard is flatly inconsistent with
McCampbell's objection to comparative value arguments. The relevance of
victim impact testimony is reflected in a consistent pattern of legislation. States
have explicitly allowed jurors to consider such evidence in capital sentencing
proceedings, which reflects popular belief that victims' interests are relevant
and should be considered. 29 This "moral consensus" significantly handicaps
McCampbell's claim that comparative value arguments violate the Eighth
Amendment.3 °
IlL Practical Considerations Minimize the Potential Damage (and
Effectiveness) of Comparative Worth Arguments
McCampbell's objection to comparative worth arguments rests upon the
assumption that such arguments are powerfully persuasive. In support of that
proposition, she cites anecdotal evidence such as an observation by the trial
judge in Humphries that the prosecutor's argument in that case was "one of the
best arguments ... in terms of effectiveness. 3 1 While arguments such as the
one at issue in the Humphries case can be effective, they are not, in my view,
universally persuasive.
29. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(7) (West Supp. 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-
3(c)(6) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984.1 (West Supp. 2004). Congress recently
enacted the Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 1(a), 118 Stat. 2260 (creating
provisions relating to crime victims' rights codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771), a statute which
extends the rights of victims in federal criminal cases. 18 U.S.C.A. § 377 1(a) (West Supp.
2005). The new law mandates, in part, that victims be provided the right "to be reasonably
heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any
parole proceeding." Id. § 3771(a)(4). The Justice for All Act reflects congressional
concurrence with the near consistent state authority recognizing the interests of victims in all
criminal proceedings.
30. McCampbell argues that comparative value arguments offend the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment for the same reasons that such arguments violate the Eighth
Amendment. As discussed above in Part I, I believe that these arguments do not violate the
Eighth Amendment unless they misstate the standard for juror consideration of the death
penalty. McCampbell additionally suggests that such arguments are violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment because they are inflammatory. McCampbell, supra note 1, at 417-19. She goes
on to recite the dangers ofjuror consideration of victim impact evidence-an argument that was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Payne. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. A prosecutor's recitation of
properly admitted victim impact evidence without contradiction of the standards by which that
evidence must be considered by the jury may be persuasive to jurors. It is not, however,
unconstitutionally inflammatory. Because these middle ground "comparative worth" arguments
include evidence which the Supreme Court has recognized as legitimate, they do not violate due
process.
31. Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206,246 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 128 (2005).
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The prosecuting authority assumes an extremely heavy burden in any
attempt to persuade a jury to impose the death penalty upon a criminal
defendant. The prosecutor must convince each of twelve individual jurors that
the defendant's acts merit his execution. If even one juror is unable to
conclude that the punishment is warranted, the penalty cannot be imposed. The
fact that a "mistake" in capital sentencing is irreversible inevitably makes jurors
cautious. Their caution elevates the prosecutor's burden.
The jury's sentencing decision is collective, yet extremely personal. The
trial judge may specifically instruct jurors that their decision as to the
punishment should be each juror's and his alone. Courts may go so far as to
tell deliberating jurors that they "must not surrender [their] honest convictions
as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinions of other
jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 32 While jurors must
consider each other's view and deliberate to reach a decision, each juror must
make a very personal determination as to whether the defendant should be put
to death.33 Juror "deliberation" in a capital sentencing hearing is fundamentally
different from that which operates in a guilt or innocence finding, as reflected
by the court's jury instructions.
The combination of the magnitude of the jury's verdict and the individual
nature of each juror's decision creates a real risk that a comparative worth
argument will explicitly or implicitly offend an individual juror. If a prosecutor
tells the jury that a defendant is less valuable than a victim and is consequently
less "worthy" of life, he is criticizing the defendant's character rather than his
conduct. That kind of characterization of a defendant may contradict an
individual juror's personal belief in that defendant's character. Moreover,
individual jurors may believe that the prosecutor's characterization is based on
improper factors such as race, gender, or socio-economic status. For example,
if the victim was Caucasian and the defendant is African-American, jurors may
believe that the prosecutor is devaluing the defendant at least in part because of
32. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-4.4(a) cmt. (2d ed. 1982) (quoting
Instruction 8.11 of Jury Instructions and Formsfor Federal Criminal Cases, 27 F.R.D. 39,97-
98 (1961)).
33. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237-40 (1988) (affirming a
supplemental instruction to the jury members to consider the thoughts and reasoning of their
fellow jury members while reaching their own decision as to guilt); Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896) (same); United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1089 (11 th Cir.
1993) (holding that there is no claim of coercion as a result of a jury instruction stating that in
the event of a hung jury, jurors should change their minds only if they become convinced that
they are wrong and not because they feel differently than others); United States v. Smith, 857
F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding no error in a jury instruction telling jurors to examine
their beliefs in light of the beliefs of the others, but to only make their final decision upon their
own beliefs).
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his race-an offensive and irrelevant factor. As determinations of value and
worth are extremely subjective, a prosecutor journeys down the path of
categorization at his peril.
McCampbell's objection to comparative value arguments also ignores the
important roles played by the judge and defense counsel in capital sentencing
hearings. All of the evidence and argument put forth by the government is
tested and rebutted by counsel for the capital defendant. Defense counsel has
the opportunity to challenge the evidence put forth by the government through
cross-examination. The defense may also present valuable mitigation
information. Of course, counsel will present argument as to how jurors should
view all of the evidence and suggest to them that the totality of the evidence
justifies a sentence other than death.
The court is even more directly involved in guiding the jury's exercise of
discretion. The court controls what sorts of evidence will be presented to the
jury. With respect to victim impact evidence, judges often restrict both the
quality and quantity of evidence presented by the government. The judge may
limit the number of witnesses who develop the "uniqueness" of the victim. The
court may also carefully confine the subject matter of the victim impact
witnesses to the two permissible purposes articulated in Payne.34 Most
significantly, the court must instruct the jury as to the methodical process by
which it must make its sentencing determination. Those instructions will make
clear that the sentencing determination should be based on a weighing of
various aggravating and mitigating factors, rather than a mathematical
calculation of comparative value.
McCampbell' s argument about the persuasiveness of comparative value
arguments fails to account for the adversarial nature of the sentencing hearing
and the court's definition of the standards which govern jury discretion. Her
position suggests that the government has undue influence in the process. It
ignores the defendant's right to challenge the evidence and counter the
arguments of the prosecutor. It implies that jurors will be dangerously misled
into disregarding or misapplying the careful instructions of the trial judge. She
overestimates the impact of prosecutorial argument in general and fails to plug
that argument into the larger context of a capital sentencing hearing.
McCampbell's objection to the use of comparative value arguments also
rests upon a mistaken impression of the impact of prosecutorial argument on
sentencing jurors. In my experience trying cases, I have become increasingly
34. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991) (holding that victim impact
evidence may be used to assist the jury in determining the moral blameworthiness of the
defendant and to assist the jury in its decision whether or not to impose the death penalty).
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convinced that jurors are more affected by evidence than by argument. While
the rhetoric of attorneys on both sides can help jurors understand the evidence
and move them toward a decision, the facts themselves have a much more
profound impact on jurors and are more responsible for their verdicts. Jurors
are able to evaluate facts and apply standards of law. Even in the face of the
tension and pressure of a capital sentencing hearing, jurors consistently abide
by their oath and base their decision on facts and law. McCampbell's paper
reflects a patronizing view ofjurors, as it assumes that they are easily misled by
a lawyer's rhetoric. My experience is directly contrary to that assumption.
Jurors generally do as they are instructed, basing their decisions on the facts
they find and the law as given by the judge.
Tipping the Scales does a good job of highlighting an emerging and
contentious trend in capital litigation. However, it fails to offer a persuasive
argument that the middle ground comparative worth arguments described above
offend the Constitutional rights of capital defendants. The Note also ignores
important components of the methodical capital litigation process.
Accordingly, Tipping the Scales fails to answer the important questions it
insightfully identifies.
